The Performance of Militaries in
Humanitarian Demining
Studies indicate that humanitarian demining under civilian oversight is safer and more
cost-efficient than humanitarian demining under military oversight. This article provides examples supporting such evidence, cites possible exceptions, and explores
reasons for performance inadequacies in military demining units.
by Ted Paterson [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]

T

here are few documented examples of
militaries performing efficient and effective humanitarian demining1 when
working under a military chain of command.
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining found only a handful of studies in which a direct comparison could be made
between HD by militaries versus nongovernmental organizations or commercial firms.2

calculated for both area demining and road
demining tasks, and are summarized in Table
1 below.
In brief, demining by military units was between 25 and 60 times more expensive than
demining by civilian contractors working in
the same country at the same time, and on similar tasks. In addition, U.N. peacekeeping forces did not demine to International Mine Action
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“Best case” for military

$15.44/m2

$0.61/m2

25 : 1

“Worst case” for military

$47.00/m2

$0.79/m2

60 : 1

“Best case” for military

$25,543/km

$727/km

35 : 1

“Worst case” for military

$5.99/m2

$0.10/m2

58 : 1

Area demining

Road demining

Table 1: Cost comparisons for humanitarian demining from Ethiopia and Eritrea

The studies surveyed concluded that military units performing HD were less productive, far more expensive and worked to lower
safety standards.
The clearest comparison derives from an
evaluation of the United Nations Mission
in Ethiopia and Eritrea3 where similar tasks
were conducted by demining units serving
within the peacekeeping force and by civilian
organizations working under commercial contracts. Cost-effectiveness comparisons were
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Standards in 2004,4 and as areas not demined
to IMAS are not considered safe for civilian
use by organizations that adhere to IMAS, the
demined areas may have needed re-clearance
before release.
Evidence also shows that military units were
less effective than civilian operators in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. From March–June 1997, U.S.
Special Operations Forces conducted training
for 450 members of the Entity Armed Forces.5
The training was based on military procedures,

Deminers training for peacekeeping duties.
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and the United Nations Mine Action
Centre did not accredit the EAF for
humanitarian demining. Approximately six months later, Special Operations Forces returned to deliver
another series of training courses to
new EAF recruits, this time working closely with UNMAC and using
its humanitarian-demining training
guidelines. Following this training,
the EAF reached HD accreditation
in June 1998.
The graph on the next page summarizes the EAF demining casualties in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
From 1997 to early 1998, the person-

nel trained in military-demining
procedures sustained 29 casualties,
19 of which resulted in death or serious injury. After 1998, the EAF
personnel trained under UNMAC
training guidelines for humanitarian demining and suffered no demining casualties from 1998–2001.6
Exceptions may be found in the
future wherein military deminers,
working under a military chain of
command, will perform as well as
or better than civilian operators.
In Vietnam, for example, army
demining units and militaryowned firms conducted extensive

unexploded-ordnance survey and
clearance operations in support of
infrastructure and other investment projects.7 However, GICHD is
unaware of any thorough comparison
of costs or of Vietnamese demining
standards relative to IMAS.
Performance differentials documented by the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea and in
Bosnia and Herzegovina do not stem
from a lack of skill on the part of
military demining personnel, many
of whom have gone on to successful
careers with NGOs and commercial operators. In addition, military
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Demining casualties of the Entity Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Stockpile destruction in Sudan.
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demining units working under civilian authorities have
proven to be an effective solution in a number of countries, including Azerbaijan,8 Chile,9 Ethiopia10 and Yemen.11 The key in such cases appears to be the existence of
a board of civilian officials (such as a National Mine Action Authority) which sees demining as essential for the
country. It ensures that capable mine-action managers
are in place, along with incentives for these managers
to deliver safe, efficient and effective demining services.
The finding that humanitarian demining is generally less productive and more costly when conducted by
military units than by civilian operators is mirrored
in the humanitarian-assistance field. For example, the
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda
concluded that “… military air transport is four to eight
times more expensive than commercial air transport.
Thus in those instances where military aircraft operated over the same routes as functioning road transport
routes ... the use of military aircraft to carry cargos that
could have travelled by road was between 20 and 40
times more expensive.”12,13
Such findings should not be a surprise. Militaries have a
different mandate from civilian organizations. In military
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operations, failure to achieve the principal objective can
spell disaster for the unit, the entire military force and the
nation as a whole. Accordingly, militaries spare no costs to
achieve their strategic objectives, even if it means that performance on other measures—such as efficiency or cost
per unit—is sacrificed. Military demining operations are
not designed to be judged against the performance rules
of the humanitarian-demining industry.
Increasingly, Western militaries have recognized that
significant savings can be made by contracting civilian
organizations to work under commercial incentives.
They now make far greater use of civilian contractors
for such tasks as transportation, facilities management and administration. Recent years have also seen
a number of initiatives to enhance the contribution that
military units make to humanitarian-demining operations. In November 2003, for example, the U.N. Security Council issued an important statement on mine
action, including: “The Security Council recognizes the
contribution that peacekeeping personnel can make in
the areas of mine risk education and demining and calls
upon troop-contributing countries, where appropriate, to train selected personnel to demine in accordance

with the International Mine Action
Standards.”14 Since the evaluation of
the UNMEE Mine Action Coordination Centre, military demining units
serving in U.N. peacekeeping missions have required accreditation
from UNMAS and must conduct
their operations in compliance with
IMAS. Improvements have also
been made in coordination and
information exchange between military and civilian operators within peacekeeping missions. Efforts
are also underway in a number of
NATO member states toward the
harmonization of mine-action doctrine and standards, at least within
peacekeeping and stabilization operations, and within the context of
humanitarian emergencies.
Situations remain in which military demining units working under
a military chain of command should

or must be used, even though they
would not be the cheapest or most
productive solution. Such scenarios
include operations in highly insecure
environments and when very rapid
emergency response is required, in
which case militaries generally have
far greater capacities than any civilian organization can muster. In other
cases, fostering military-to-military
contacts is the primary objective,
and humanitarian-demining activities are simply a means to this end.
Studies show that demining conducted under civilian oversight provides the safest, most effective and
cost-efficient option. Thus, militaries
should be trained to humanitarian
standards and operate under civilian
oversight when engaged in humanitarian-demining operations.
See Endnotes, Page 82
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